Introduction
Underwriting cycles in property-liability insurance have been extensively documented over the past half-century in many countries and many lines of insurance.
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The underwriting cycle is defined as alternating periods of hard markets in which insurance prices and insurer profitability are high and soft markets with low insurance prices and low insurer profitability. Most of the research documenting the existence of cycles relies on the time series behavior of published underwriting information on loss ratios and underwriting profits. Theories have arisen to explain the existence of underwriting cycles, and these frequently rely on how the insurance product is priced (e.g., Cummins and Outreville, 1987 , Winter, 1994 , and Cummins and Danzon, 1994 among others).
But insurance is unlike many other goods in that in some lines there may be no price at which customers can buy all of the quantity (coverage) desired. Instead, the insurance product is a package which consists of price (the premiums paid) and quantity (the amount of coverage). Previous empirical underwriting cycle research has been unable to distinguish between the amount of coverage provided and the rate for coverage, largely because data are unavailable. Thus as the market hardens, for example, researchers do not know whether increases in the price of insurance are caused by an increase in the price per exposure, a reduction of coverage, or both. Further, if both price per exposure increases and coverage amounts decrease, researchers cannot tell the relative importance of changes in the premium components.
The purpose of this research is to investigate the cyclic behavior of price per exposure vis a vis amount of coverage available in a relatively new, volatile, international, and important insurance line: satellite insurance. More specifically, the time series behavior of rates-on-line and annual industry-wide coverage availability are analyzed to determine whether one or both of these premium components are cyclic. Further, two prominent underwriting cycle theories, the rational expectations/ institutional intervention hypothesis (Cummins and Outreville, 1987) and the capacity constraint theory (Winter, 1994) , are tested with satellite insurance industry data. Our analysis provides for a much richer understanding of the performance of this line of insurance over time and the applicability of certain underwriting cycle theories than possible in previously published underwriting cycle studies.
The satellite insurance industry is a good candidate for an underwriting cycle study. Volatility and cyclicality of results are emphasized in the satellite insurance literature (e.g., and 2007 , Quarterly Launch Report, 2002 . Hard and soft markets occur in this industry as well. In the early 1980s a specialist satellite underwriting market emerged, and it became very competitive. Rates were driven down to about 7-8 percent of the sum insured, and capacity exceeded $200 million.
Unfortunately, in the first half of the 1980s, the satellite insurance market experienced a crisis due to a series of losses (e.g., Intelsat IV, Palapa B2, Westar VI and the Space Shuttle Challenger) (Doherty, 1989) . Rates increased to about 20 to 30 percent of the sum insured and capacity shrank below $100 million. Coverage was difficult to find for the most valuable satellites. In contrast, in the mid 1990s, the market was soft with low rates and capacity in excess of $1 billion. New insurers entered the market at this time.
But by the end of the 1990s, the market had again hardened after suffering several losses.
Some insurers withdrew from the market, including one of the market leaders, the Italian insurer Generali. Capacity decreased, and rates rose rapidly. More recently, the market has not seen many losses, and rates and capacity are stable (Manikowski, 2005a) .
The data set used in this study consists of time series data from 1968 to 2005 and comprises virtually the entire history of the satellite insurance industry. Annual data for rates-on-line and market-wide coverage availability in addition to underwriting results (i.e., the loss ratio) are available for analysis. Both rates-on-line and industry-wide coverage availability are analyzed to determine whether cycles exist in these variables.
Then regression analysis is conducted to determine the primary factors associated with these components of the premium. More specifically, regression equations for rate-online and for satellite insurance coverage availability are formulated. The regression variables include variables for testing the capacity constraint and rational expectations/ institutional intervention hypothesis. To allow for rates-on-line and coverage availability to be jointly determined, the two equations are estimated using simultaneous equations techniques (i.e., three-stage-least-squares).
This research is important for several reasons. Underwriting cycles are found in rates-on-line and satellite insurance industry coverage availability, but not the loss ratio.
This result is important because it may indicate that previous studies in which cycles
were not found in sample countries or lines may in fact be cyclical, if the number of exposure units and the coverage per exposure could be controlled for. The results also provide support for the rational expectations/ institutional intervention hypothesis for determination of rates-on-line, but not for industry coverage availability. The capacity constraint hypothesis is supported. The latter is important because the capacity constraint hypothesis has not been supported by several prominent empirical studies, at least for some lines of insurance (e.g., Winter, 1994, Gron, 1994, and Danzon, among 
others).
This research is important, also, because of the importance of the satellite industry.
Satellites fulfill a variety of functions ranging from voice/data/video communications globally (e.g., news gathering/distribution, video and data to handhelds), meteorological analysis (e.g., weather forecasting and storm tracking), GPS (e.g., position location, mapping, emergency services), and military and scientific needs. In 2005, worldwide satellite industry revenues were approximately $88.8 billion (Satellite Industry Fact Sheet, 2007) . The National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) Satellite Task Force Report to the President stated, "The commercial satellite industry is critical to our national, economic, and homeland security" (NSTAC, 2004) . Without satellite insurance, it would be difficult to obtain financing for purchases and launches of satellites. Further, satellites are purchased and manufactured well in advance of their launch, and volatility in satellite insurance pricing could result in a satellite ready to be launched when satellite insurance rates are very high or capacity scarce.
2 Thus a wellfunctioning satellite insurance market is critical to the world.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section a brief overview of the development of the satellite insurance industry and performance statistics are provided. The results from this section form the basis for the Hypotheses section which follows. The Data and the Methodology are discussed in the next two sections, respectively. Results are discussed in the following section. The last section concludes.
The Satellite Insurance Market
In this section, the development of the satellite insurance market is reviewed from its inception in the 1960s to the present. The performance of this market is reviewed also to provide some preliminary evidence about its susceptibility to underwriting cycles.
Satellite Insurance Development
Until the mid-1960s most satellites that were launched were related to the military aims of the United States and Soviet Union, and were not of interest to insurers.
However, two developments made insurers take note of this potential industry. The first was the launch of the first artificial earth satellite (Sputnik 1) on October 4, 1957, and the second was the sending of the first man (Yuri Gagarin) into space on April 12, 1961.
From these, it began to be clear to the insurance industry that there would soon be a commercial space market available for exploitation (Manikowski, 2005b) .
In the formative years of the space age, projects were uninsurable because launch vehicles were unreliable and most payloads were experimental. Therefore, the risk was retained by governments and the space agencies that financed the flights. The American Communication Satellite Corporation (ACSC), founded in 1962, was the first company devoted to using new satellite technology for commercial purposes and was interested in obtaining satellite insurance. On April 6, 1965, ACSC obtained the first space insurance policy to protect the first commercial geostationary communication satellite, Early Bird (an Intelsat I-F1 satellite). The $3.5 million policy provided pre-launch insurance (i.e., it covered material damages to the satellite prior to lift-off only) (Daouphars, 1999) .
At the beginning, satellite risk was mainly placed in the international aviation market, simply because this market was more familiar with the problems of space flight than other insurance markets. However, it soon became apparent that insuring satellite risks is difficult and requires highly specialized insurer knowledge for pricing and claims
handling. This line of business is subject to very large losses, and one failed launch could easily consume the entire premium (Bannister, 1992) .
The complex and technical features of this line of insurance in combination with the possibility of large losses has resulted in a limited number of insurers offering this coverage.
3 At present, satellite insurers comprise a relatively small community within the insurance industry. However, the satellite insurance market is an international market, with satellite insurance centers in Europe (London, Paris, and Munich) and in the United
States (New York and Washington D.C.)
Unlike most other areas of insurance, the satellite insurance industry does not benefit from a large homogeneous exposure pool to which the law of large numbers can be applied. Some insurers have concluded that the satellite insurance industry requires a much higher number of launches (possibly 600 launches with a variety of launch vehicles) to accurately measure risk from homogeneous exposures in this industry (Hollings, 1988) . In contrast, in the period 1968 to 2005, there have been a total of 534 insured launches, with satellite technology changing dramatically over this period.
According to Hollings (1988) , there are too few statistical events to estimate failures with reliability in this industry. 4 Since a limited number of insurers provide this insurance and 3 Some of the features of satellite insurance that make it so difficult to insure include: potential large losses for each launch event; most losses are total; difficulties in solving problems with satellites that occur in outer space; difficulty in determining the causes of accidents; the large number of insured objects, lack of risk homogeneity; the possibility of large loss accumulation; the covered object is in a hostile space environment; and losses can occur not only from outside forces but from a breakdown in the satellite or rocket itself. 4 Of course, risks do not have to be homogeneous to be diversifiable (and hence insurable), as evidenced by the types of risk insured by Lloyds of London. However, in general, it can be difficult to find insurance for large, unique risks.
losses are large when they occur, some believe that a loss in one area of the satellite insurance industry directly influences the ability of insurers to cover other satelliterelated risks. That is, the same players underwrite pre-launch, launch, and in-orbit insurance so that losses, when they occur, all come from the same basic pool. A summary of the different types of satellite insurance policies appears in Appendix 1.
The satellite insurance market suffered losses for several years due to "generic failures" (i.e., breakdowns recurrent in similar satellites' platforms). This issue is very topical and the problem is a result of production line satellite manufacturing. If one satellite suffers a failure, then other satellites of similar design can be prone to similar failures. The rating of an individual satellite can be affected by the health status of similar satellites. A design defect is normally covered as long as it is not known or evidenced at risk attachment. A generic failure is a particular case of design defect that affects several satellites with the same mechanism. At policy renewal, generic defects are usually excluded from insurance cover (Brafman, 2002) .
Satellite Insurance Market Performance
To gauge the size of the satellite insurance market and its risk characteristics, The satellite insurance industry is shaped by a number of forces: limited number of new insurance contracts annually (usually no more than 30), large potential losses (e.g., in excess of $250 million), participation of several insurers for one launch due to the large loss potential, and a limited number of underwriters (i.e., less than 30). All of this 5 Unfortunately, there are no data on how many of the launches are for military or national security purposes over our time period. 6 There is a difference between the number of insured satellites and the number of insured launches because sometimes only launch costs are insured (i.e., the payload (satellite) is not insured).
has led to overall volatility in the industry. Volatility in premiums and claims is demonstrated in Figure 3 . This figure indicates premiums and claims in this industry from 1968 to the present. Figure 5 contains the minimum rate-on-line, the average rate-on-line and capacity, where capacity is defined as the sum of the maximum amount of coverage available for one risk by major satellite insurance underwriters. Figure 5 indicates that capacity grew steadily in the industry at first. However, capacity declined in the mid 1980s due to a series of losses including the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger in 1986.
But capacity began to grow again a few years later and reached its peak in 1999 at $1.3 billion. Since 1999 capacity has been shrinking (Manikowski, 2002) .
Historically, rates were set too low in the early years of satellite insurance, which meant that total premium income was eroded by a few claims. Prices charged now are similar to rates from the second half of the 1980s, and rates are about three times more than they were at the end of the 1990s. Traditionally, rates have been set in reaction to claims experience, rather than by statistical analysis of the launch and in-orbit record (Space Insurance Briefing, 2001) . Evidence for this can be found in Figure 6 . From this figure it appears that increases in rates occur after claims increase.
Not only does Figure 5 indicate wide variation in rates-on-line and capacity, but these factors also appear to be cyclical. Further, it does not appear that capacity and rates vary directly together. For example, capacity appears to be at an all-time high in 1999 when the average rate is relatively low. An inverse relationship appears to exist between capacity and rates in other years as well.
It is interesting to consider how capacity in the satellite insurance industry varies with respect to capacity in the worldwide insurance industry. Unfortunately, capacity data are not available for the worldwide insurance industry over the period 1968 to 2005.
However some approximate indications of industry capitalization might be gleaned from trends in the data on the top 100 reinsurers reported by Standard & Poor's and from U.S.
professional reinsurers, which are portrayed in Figure 7 . In interpreting this figure, it is important to keep in mind that satellite insurance capacity is defined in terms of the sum of limits on policies available in the market, while the data for reinsurers is based on their capital or surplus. This figure suggests that there is an approximate connection in trends between worldwide capitalization (as proxied by the data in Figure 7 ), and satellite insurance industry capacity. Hence the condition of the overall insurance industry may be important when analyzing the satellite insurance industry.
Finally, the performance of the satellite insurance industry may have important repercussions on the launching of satellites and their timing. The satellite insurance market appears to many to be an unpredictable, cyclic market. Thus a purchaser of satellite insurance should monitor developments in the satellite insurance market to assess the best time for placing their risk in the market. Of course, there is always the possibility that an insured might be forced for a variety of reasons to purchase insurance when the market is at its peak. Thus developments in the satellite insurance market can have an important impact on costs (prices) associated with the services that satellites provide to buyers (consumers).
Hypotheses Specification
The preceding section has demonstrated graphically that there is a connection between satellite insurance rates-on-line and past losses. The rational expectations/ institutional intervention hypothesis associates insurance prices with past losses Outreville, 1987 and Lamm-Tennant and Weiss, 1997) . In addition, there also appears to be a connection between rates-on-line and capacity. Several strains of the underwriting cycle literature associate insurance prices with capacity (e.g. Harrington and Niehaus, 2000) . Formal hypotheses concerning these factors and the satellite insurance industry are developed in this section.
Rational Expectations/ Institutional Intervention Hypothesis
Cummins and Outreville (1987) Their results are consistent with Cummins and Outreville (1987) .
But insurance prices or premiums are found by multiplying its two components together, the rate-on-line and the amount of coverage provided.
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The rational expectations/ institutional intervention hypothesis does not distinguish between these two components. Hence in this research the relationship between both of these components of price and past loss experience are investigated:
Hypothesis 1a: Rate-on-line is positively associated with past losses.
A corollary hypothesis can be formulated about the relationship between the quantity of coverage available and past losses. That is, increasing the rate-on-line is one way in 7 Rate-on-line is defined as the amount charged per $1000 of coverage.
which prices can be increased when unfavorable past loss experience develops. Prices can also be effectively increased if the quantity of coverage is reduced when unfavorable past loss experience develops, even if the rate-on-line remains the same. This leads to Hypothesis 1b:
The maximum amount of coverage available is negatively related to past losses.
Note that an increase in the rate-on-line or a decrease in amount of coverage would provide evidence in favor of the rational expectations/ institutional intervention hypothesis.
In fact news stories are replete with examples of premiums increasing at the same time that coverage is reduced during hard markets and insurance crises (e.g., Niehaus, 2000 and Danzon, 2000) . Thus it is worthwhile to confirm whether both rate-on-line and amount of coverage are responsive to past losses. It would be interesting to determine, also, whether there are differential changes in average rates and quantity of coverage as past losses develop.
Capacity Constraint Hypothesis. Winter (1994) and Gron (1994) develop a model of insurance prices in which price is inversely related to capacity (capacity constraint hypothesis). Thus if the capacity constraint hypothesis is valid, we should find that as the amount of coverage available for writing satellite insurance increases (i.e., capacity increases) then the rate-on-line decreases. This leads to Hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2: Satellite insurance rates are inversely related to the amount of satellite insurance coverage available.
But this gives rise to the question of how capacity for satellite insurance is decided by insurers. According to Hypothesis 1b above, past losses would play a role in capacity determination. But it is also possible that the amount of industry coverage available for satellite insurance is related to how much the market is willing to pay for coverage (i.e., the rate-on-line). That is, maximum coverage amounts for the satellite insurance industry and the rate-on-line may be determined simultaneously. The latter is a testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Satellite insurance rates and maximum available coverage are determined simultaneously.
A potentially viable alternative hypothesis might be that market forces determine the rateon-line for satellite insurance, and that satellite insurance underwriters base the maximum amount of coverage they are willing to provide on this market rate. Prior underwriting studies have not investigated this issue at any length, mainly because the necessary data were unavailable.
Data
The data for the satellite insurance analysis covers the period 1968 to 2005 and were obtained directly from market participants: insurance brokers, 8 underwriters, 9 and additional companies (e.g., Ascend 10 and Sciemus 11 ). These data comprise virtually the entire history of the satellite insurance industry.
Underwriting information for claims, premiums, loss ratios, rates-on-line and capacity are used in the analysis. Claims are defined as claims paid from launch insurance and satellites-in-orbit insurance. Premiums are written premiums from launch insurance and satellites-in-orbit insurance. The loss ratio is defined in this study as the ratio of claims to premiums, as data for losses incurred are unavailable. Rates-on-line pertain to launch plus one year of in-orbit operations. The minimum rate is the rate for the best (i.e., most reliable) risk or technology. The maximum rate applies to the worst or most unreliable risk. The average rate is the arithmetic mean of all individual rates.
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Capacity is the sum of the maximum amount that each underwriter is willing to provide on one satellite for launch and in-orbit insurance.
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Supplemental data such as macroeconomic variables were obtained from U.S. remaining satellite insurance data were obtained from press stories about the satellite insurance industry (e.g., total number of launches).
Methodology
The analysis of underwriting cycles in the satellite insurance industry is undertaken in two stages. First, tests are performed to determine whether underwriting cycles exist in this line, and the length of the cycle if relevant. Next, the methodology for testing the hypotheses is discussed. This discussion includes a description of the regression models as well as issues associated with using time series data (unit roots, cointegration, and autocorrelation).
12 Data are not available to compute a weighted average rate, defined as the sum of the rate of company i multiplied by the proportion of total satellite premiums written by company i. 13 This capacity is theoretical capacity, since the underwriter may not actually apply the maximum amount when underwriting a risk.
Underwriting Cycle Determination
A second-order autoregressive model proposed by Venezian (1985) is used to obtain the parameters for testing for the existence of the underwriting cycle. More specifically, parameters needed to measure the cycle period are obtained by estimating the following autoregressive model with ordinary least squares:
where P t is the variable potentially subject to a cycle, t is a time subscript, and ω t is a random error term. Several dependent variables are tested: the average satellite insurance rate, the minimum satellite insurance rate, satellite insurance capacity, and satellite insurance loss ratios.
A cycle is present if a 1 > 0, a 2 < 0 and (a 1 ) 2 + 4a 2 < 0 (Venezian 1985). The model coefficients can be used to estimate cycle periods for the variables of interest, assuming that the conditions necessary for a cycle exist. The cycle period is expressed as follows:
Analysis of Satellite Insurance Rates and Capacity
Regression models are used to test Hypotheses 1 to 3. However, before regression can be conducted, the data must be tested for problems commonly associated with time series data. First, unit root tests are conducted on the regression variables to determine whether the variables are stationary (Dickey and Fuller, 1979 Two regression models are formulated to test the hypotheses. In the first regression model, the satellite insurance rate is assumed to be a function of capacity, past losses, and control variables consisting of the discount rate, demand for satellite insurance and the average value of a new satellite. In the second regression model, capacity is assumed to be a function of the satellite insurance rate, past loss ratios, and other control variables for the condition of the overall insurance industry. These models are discussed more fully below. A summary of the models is provided in Table 1 .
Satellite Insurance Rate Model. The satellite insurance rate model is specified as 14 The lagged loss ratios were the only variables that did not have a unit root. 15 This result is based on a one percent critical value for the test statistic. Using a 5 percent critical value, capacity and share price were cointegrated. Nevertheless, taking a first difference with variables that are stationary is not necessarily a problem econometrically. 16 A 5 percent significance level is used for this analysis. that is multiplied by the coverage amount to determine the premium (i.e., rate-online*coverage amount = premium). Change in the real minimum rate-on-line (i.e., the rate applied for the most reliable risks and technology) is used as the dependent variable.
This rate was preferred to the real average rate because it is considered a more competitive rate, and therefore should more accurately reflect market conditions. In contrast, the average rate is based partly on the maximum rate, and the maximum rate has features of a penalty to it. The maximum rate may be very high (sometimes exceeding 30 percent of the sum insured) even when other rates charged in the market are moderate.
Furthermore, since the average rate is an arithmetic mean (rather than a premiumweighted average), it is impossible to know how close this rate is to the actual rates charged in the market.
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The rational expectations/institutional intervention hypothesis posits that autocorrelation in prices exists because underwriting profits incorporate information about accounting profits for the prior two years (Cummins and Outreville, 1987) . Hence, current rates would be expected to be related to losses for the three prior years. This is because policies are written throughout the year so that accounting profits in year t-1 reflect losses in years t-1 and t-2, while accounting profits in year t-2 reflect losses in years t-2 and t-3. Therefore, changes in the lagged loss ratios from the three prior years are included in the model (Lamm-Tennant and Weiss, 1997). The expected signs for changes in the lagged loss ratio variables are positive.
The real value of the capacity variable is included to test the capacity constraint hypothesis. Capacity as it is defined here is stated in terms of the real dollar amount of the maximum coverage for satellite insurance available in the market for year t. The capacity constraint hypothesis posits that a negative relationship exists between price and the amount of coverage that insurers are capable of providing. That is, the maximum coverage available for satellite insurance should be related to the capability of the satellite insurance industry to write this business, everything else held equal. This capability should be related to the financial resources or capital allocated to this line.
Under the capacity constraint theory, the coefficient for this variable should be negative.
The other control variables in this model include demand, interest rates, and the average value of a new satellite. Demand for satellite insurance is expected to be related to price, with increases in demand associated with increases in prices. Demand is proxied by the number of total launches in a given year. (Recall that only a fraction of total launches is insured in a given year.) Considerable prior literature has shown that insurance prices are inversely related to discount rates (e.g., Cummins and Phillips, 2000) .
Therefore a real mid-term interest rate is included in the model, the U.S. 5 year Treasury bond rate, and the expected sign of this variable is negative. 18 The rate charged for satellite insurance should be related also to the value of the satellites that are launched, since the rate must be sufficient to reflect loss potential. where υ t is the error term and the subscript t is defined as before. The dependent variable in this regression was described earlier. The control variables in this model can be categorized in terms of past underwriting experience in this line, the minimum satellite insurance rate, and overall insurance industry conditions. These variables are described below.
Since capacity is a component of premium determination, it is expected to be negatively related to past changes in loss ratios (i.e., the capacity allocated is expected to decrease as underwriting performance worsens). Thus the expected signs for the change in loss ratio variables are negative according to the rational expectations/ institutional intervention hypothesis.
The price (minimum rate) for satellite insurance is included in the regression. In general, the economics of supply and demand theory would imply a positive sign for this variable (i.e., a higher price leads to a greater supply). However, according to the capacity constraint hypothesis the expected sign for this variable is negative. occurred over the sample period. As a result of this, the remaining, larger acquiring reinsurers may obtain a diversification benefit from their larger real capital base. In this case, capacity might be negatively related to the number of professional reinsurers (Cummins and Weiss, 2000) .
Insurers' surplus determines the capability to write business and is directly influenced by stock market performance. That is, realized capital gains (losses) flow through to surplus through income and unrealized capital gains (losses) are typically folded into surplus. Hence changes in stock prices may have a significant impact on the amount of insurance that insurers are capable of writing. Therefore this variable is used as an alternative measure of the relative amount of capitalization in the worldwide insurance industry. A positive coefficient is expected for this variable. Finally, a trend variable is included in the model to allow for underwriters' decisions about capacity to be adjusted by increased familiarity with this industry over time.
Estimation of the Regression Equations. Equations (3) and (4) are each tested individually for autocorrelation. Because some regressors may be endogenous, Durbin's alternative test for autocorrelation is used (Durbin, 1970) . Also, due to the relatively small number of observations, the small sample correction suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) is implemented. The results indicated that autocorrelation was not a problem in either equation.
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In equations (3) and (4), the change in the rate and change in capacity variables appear both as dependent and independent variables in the set of equations. Therefore equations (3) and (4) were estimated as a system of equations using three-stage-least squares. The error term ε t is assumed to be N(0, σ R 2 ) and υ t is assumed to be N(0, σ C 2 ).
The system of equations is iterated until the parameters converge. (Greene, 2003, pp. 405-407) .
Results
Summary statistics for all variables used in the underwriting cycle analysis and hypotheses tests are reported in Table 2 . The results of the test to determine whether underwriting cycles exist in satellite insurance, and estimation of cycle lengths (where appropriate) are presented in Table 3 . The results of the regressions used for hypothesis testing are found in Table 4 . This section discusses the main results.
Underwriting Cycle Determination
According to Table 3 underwriting cycles exist in the minimum rate-on-line, average rate-on-line, and capacity. The cycle periods associated with the minimum and average rate-on-line are 12.36 and 17.26, respectively. These periods are relatively long compared to the average six year cycle commonly cited in some studies. However, Lamm-Tennant and Weiss (1997) found cycle periods of 10, 12, and 18 years in their study for some countries and lines, while Cummins and Outreville (1987) found cycle lengths as long as 11 years in their study. Chen, Wong, and Lee (1999) found a cycle length of approximately 14 years in some of their results. Perhaps the rather long cycle period in this line for rates and capacity is related to the lack of homogeneous data on which to base satellite insurance rates. Recall that this line does not benefit from the law of large numbers relative to most other insurance lines with respect to homogeneity of data. Hence data for several periods as well as considerable judgment may enter the rating process leading to a longer cycle period.
Surprisingly, no cycle is detected in the loss ratio. The reason for this is not clear.
Perhaps the explanation lies in the difference in cycle periods for capacity and rates-online. That is, capacity and rates-on-line do not appear to have the same phase. This might occur if there are important factors affecting capacity that do not affect rates. For example, these variables might be out of phase if rates are based on past losses primarily, while capacity is determined largely from overall insurance industry conditions. Recall that premiums are found by multiplying the rate-on-line with the amount of coverage. If the latter two are out of phase, then the time series behavior associated with cycles may not be observable from data based on premiums. An alternative explanation is that large losses might skew the loss history for this industry, affecting its time series performance or that paid losses rather than incurred losses are being used to determine the ratio. Table 4 contains results for testing the hypotheses. The hypotheses primarily center on the rational expectations/ institutional intervention hypothesis and the capacity constraint hypothesis. The main variables of interest for the hypotheses are the coefficients for the changes in the minimum rate, changes in lagged loss ratios, and changes in capacity. The remainder of this section discusses these results in more detail.
Results from Hypothesis Testing
According to Hypothesis 1a, the minimum rate-on-line should be positively and significantly related to lagged past losses. In both the OLS and three-stage-least-squares results for the price equation, the coefficients for changes in the lagged loss ratios are positive, and the coefficients for all of these are significant in the three-stage-least-squares results. In the OLS results, the coefficients for the change in the first and second lagged loss ratios are significant while the coefficient for the third lagged loss ratio is positive with a t-statistic of 1.5. Thus Hypothesis 1a is largely supported.
Hypothesis 1b posits that capacity (i.e., the maximum amount of coverage available) should be negatively related to past losses. The results for the capacity equation in Table 4 do not support this hypothesis. That is the coefficients for changes in the lagged loss ratios are not significant in OLS or three-stage-least-squares, although four of the six coefficients do have a negative sign. Thus past losses do not appear to be significantly related to capacity, contradicting Hypothesis 1b.
The coefficient for the change in capacity is negative and significant in the price equation and the change in the minimum rate is negative and significant in the capacity equation. These two results, taken together, indicate that average rates and capacity are determined simultaneously. This result supports Hypothesis 3. The absolute value of the elasticity associated with the change in the minimum rate with respect to the change in capacity is approximately 0.2, while the absolute value of the elasticity associated with the change in capacity with respect to a change in the minimum rate is 0.8. Thus changes in capacity appear to be relatively more responsive to changes in the minimum rate than the other way around.
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23 As a robustness check, the same regression analysis was conducted using the change in the real average rate-on-line in place of the change in the real minimum rate. The results for these models are similar. Changes in the real average rate are positively and significantly related to changes in all of the lagged loss ratios in the three-stage-least-squares results. Change in the real average rate is negatively and significantly related to change in capacity in the capacity equation. In the average rate equation, the change in capacity is negatively related to the change in the average rate but the coefficient is not significant (t-stat is -0.75). Thus, overall, the results are similar across the two sets of models, but the results using the change in the minimum rate are stronger. 24 As another robustness test, the lagged change in the minimum rate was included as an additional variable in the capacity equation. Under the normal supply and demand theory argument, a positive sign for this Changes in capacity appear to be significantly related to changes in overall insurance industry conditions. That is, change in the share price has a positive and significant coefficient in both the OLS and three-stage-least-squares results in Table 4 .
Recall that increases in the value of insurers' stock holdings are folded directly into surplus, enhancing the ability of insurers to cover losses. That this variable is significant in the regressions is not surprising given the dramatic change in the stock market over the reinsurer capital appears to be reasonably related to top 100 reinsurer capitalization.
Then regression models were run over the period 1986 to 2005 using the change in the new variable would be expected. However, the sign for this variable was negative in both the OLS and three-stage-least-squares results, although the coefficient was not significant. 25 Perhaps the change in stock price variable is picking up the same effect as the change in the reinsurer surplus variable (since stock results are reflected in surplus). This may explain the lack of significance for the coefficient for the change in reinsurer surplus variable.
real S&P capital variable in place of the change in U.S. professional reinsurer surplus.
Since only 20 observations could be used, the changes in the loss ratio variables were deleted from the capacity equation. 26 The results indicated that the change in S&P's capital estimate was not significantly related to the change in capacity for the satellite insurance industry, while the change in the stock price variable remained positive and significant at the 1 percent level. 27 These results reinforce the results found in Table 4 .
With respect to the other regression control variables, the change in the minimum rate is negatively related to the change in the discount rate as expected. The results also indicate that there is a general downward trend in the change in capacity for the satellite insurance industry since the coefficient for trend in the capacity equation is negative and significant. None of the other regression control variables are significant in the price and capacity equations.
Conclusion
This study uses a unique, unpublished data set that covers the inception of the satellite insurance industry to the present to investigate underwriting cycles. The main objectives are to determine whether an underwriting cycle is present, and to determine the length and causes of the underwriting cycle if it exists. In the course of doing this, the rational expectations/ institutional intervention and capacity constraint hypotheses are tested. The two components of premiums (the rate-on-line and the amount of coverage available in the industry) are analyzed, and this is the first research to conduct 26 Recall that first differences are used in the regressions resulting in the loss of one observation. 27 As another experiment, data from Guy Carpenter for rate-on-line in the catastrophe reinsurance market was tested (Guy Carpenter, 2006) . The rate-on-line data are available from 1990 to 2005. Regressions were run in which change in Guy Carpenter's rate-on-line was substituted for change in U.S. professional reinsurer surplus in the capacity equation. Once again, this variable was not significant, while the stock price variable remained significant at the 1 percent level.
underwriting cycle analysis on each component individually. The latter is important, because insurance can be considered as a package in which the coverage amount and premium are determined simultaneously.
The results largely confirm the existence of an underwriting cycle in the satellite insurance market because underwriting cycles are found in the minimum rate-on-line, average rate-on-line, and capacity. The corresponding cycle periods are relatively long (10 to 25 years) compared to the average six year cycle commonly cited in other studies.
No underwriting cycle is found in the loss ratio, unlike other studies.
The analysis of changes in the minimum rate-on-line supports the rational expectations/institutional intervention hypothesis because a positive and significant relationship between the minimum-rate-on line and lagged loss ratios are found.
Conversely, capacity, measured as the sum of the maximum limits available on one risk from industry underwriters, is not significantly related to lagged loss ratios. Instead, maximum coverage available in the satellite insurance industry is more significantly related to capitalization in the worldwide insurance industry.
Because of the unique data used in this study we are able to determine that the maximum coverage available in the satellite insurance industry and the rate-on-line are determined simultaneously. The minimum rate-on-line is negatively related to capacity (coverage availability), as predicted by the capacity constraint theory. Further, our results suggest that changes in capacity are more sensitive to changes in the minimum rate than the other way around. No previous study has been able to undertake this sort of analysis. 
Appendix 1 Types of Satellite Insurance Policies
Various types of satellite insurance policies have been developed through the collaborative work of aerospace clients, brokers, and insurance underwriters. The goal was to develop flexible forms of insurance for this volatile class of exposure (d 'Angelo, 1994) . Over time and with increasing experience, the insurance market has continued to offer better scope of insurance cover. Currently three types of satellite insurance are available, and these are described in this appendix.
Property insurance for pre-launch, launch, and in orbit damages
Coverage is provided against physical loss or damage of the asset during the prelaunch period (i.e., during storage in the launch area, the configuration of the satellite 28 and the deployment of the satellite on the launch missile). This coverage usually attaches after offloading the satellite and the launch vehicle at the insurance location (e.g. the launch platform) and terminates at "intentional ignition." Coverage is usually placed in the London marine and cargo insurance market.
Although launch insurance originally was limited to the actual launch phase, coverage now extends for a considerable period of initial satellite operation. 29 The policy provides coverage for losses arising out of the launch process and during early orbit operations such as during transfer into orbit and initial deployments. Coverage then continues throughout in-orbit acceptance to the end of the policy period. Usually the 28 Configuration of the satellite may include parameters such as nodal period, inclination of the orbit, apogee and perigee. The nodal period is the time period between two successive northbound crossings of the equator (usually in minutes). With respect to inclination of the orbit, a polar orbit is 90 degrees and an equatorial orbit is 0 degrees. The apogee is the highest altitude above the Earth's surface (in kilometers) and the perigee is the lowest altitude. 29 The definition of the "launch" varies from contract to contract, but attachment of risk typically occurs at intentional ignition of the launcher's main engines, the opening of the launch table restraints, or at lift-off. minimum coverage period is at least 180 days following the launch for geostationary orbit spacecraft to ensure that the spacecraft has experienced a full season of solar eclipses in its orbit. Coverage usually includes payment for the proportion of satellite capability lost as a result of failure, with provisions made for loss of payload function and loss of service life due to premature consumption of propellants or excessive degradation of the solar array power. Coverage for payload losses is usually for an agreed upon amount for each transponder. Coverage for "satellite loss of lifetime" is based on estimates of the remaining life after the loss of fuel or power giving rise to the claim.
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Satellites that are not transponder based, such as geo-mobile or imaging systems, have loss formulas based on their performance specifications and commercial operations requirements (Margo, 2000) .
In-orbit insurance, also known as "life" insurance, covers proper functioning of the satellite during its operational lifetime, usually in yearly renewable phases. It usually commences from the expiration of the launch policy. Coverage is, however, subject to a review of the satellite health status prior to commencement of coverage for each policy period. If anomalies occur, exclusions may be introduced by insurers, or by the buyer, in order to maintain coverage for the remainder of the satellite's life at reasonable cost (Wegener and Schöffski, 1997) .
Third party liability insurance
Space third party liability insurance covers the legal liability arising from damage to third parties during the preparations for launch, the lift-off itself, in-orbit operations of a satellite program, and, finally, re-entry. Compensation is provided in the event of personal injury and property damage to third parties, both on the ground and in space, caused by the launch vehicle or the satellite. Thus damages such as the following are covered by third party liability insurance: damages occurring when a satellite, a rocket, or its components fall to the ground; damages from fire during ignition; damages from an explosion of a satellite in orbit; and collision of the satellite with another spacecraft (Manikowski, 2005b) .
Warranty Insurance
Warranty insurance includes re-flight guarantees in the event of a failed launch, and provides coverage for loss of revenue and incentive payments. Incentive payments are additional compensation paid by the buyer to the manufacturer, if the satellite meets all agreed upon technical requirements. That is, the price of the satellite can include two things -a minimum (basic) price that is paid prior to delivery and the incentive payments, paid conditionally after delivery. Manufacturers can insure against the loss of the difference between the down payment and the full price, although it is rarely used in practice these days (Schöffski and Wegener, 1999 Definitions: Minimum rate is the rate-on-line for the best risk and technology; Loss ratio is the ratio of claims to premiums; capacity is the sum of the maximum ammounts each satellite underwriter is willing to provide on one satellite for launch; Number of launches is the total number of launches (insured and uninsured); new satellite value is the value of a new satellite; share price is the real stock price for NYSE (Shiller, 2002) ; Number of Reinsurers is the number of U.S. professional reinsurers;Reinsurer Surplus is the sum of surplus for U.S. professional reinsurers; Discount Rate is the 5 year U.S. Treasury bond rate; average rate is an arithmetic mean of all individual rates; The notation ∆X=X t -X t-1 . All dollar amounts are expressed in real dollars. 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 7 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 5
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Launch Failure Launch Success 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 25% 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Trend +/-Note: Minimum rate is the rate-on-line for the best risk and technology; Loss ratio is the ratio of claims to premiums; capacity is the sum of the maximum amounts each satellite underwriter is willing to provide on one satellite for launch; Number of launches is the total number of launches (insured and uninsured); new satellite value is the value of a new satellite; share price is the real stock price for NYSE (Shiller, 2002) ; Number of Reinsurers is the number of U.S. professional reinsurers;Reinsurer Surplus is the sum of surplus for U.S. professional reinsurers; Discount Rate is the 5 year U.S. Treasury bond rate. All dollar amounts are expressed in real dollars. Note: Minimum rate is the rate-on-line for the best risk and technology; Loss ratio is the ratio of claims to premiums; capacity is the sum of the maximum amounts each satellite underwriter is willing to provide on one satellite for launch; Number of launches is the total number of launches (insured and uninsured); new satellite value is the value of a new satellite; share price is the real stock price for NYSE (Shiller, 2002) ; Number of Reinsurers is the number of U.S. professional reinsurers;Reinsurer Surplus is the sum of surplus for U.S. professional reinsurers; Discount Rate is the 5 year U.S. Treasury bond rate; average rate is an arithmetic mean of all individual rates; premiums are written premiums from launch and in-orbit satellites; underwriting result is premiums minus claims. The notation ∆X=X t -X t-1 a in in millions USD. b in thousands of USD. Note: Minimum rate is the rate-on-line for the best risk and technology; Loss ratio is the ratio of claims to premiums; capacity is the sum of the maximum ammounts each satellite underwriter is willing to provide on one satellite for launch; Number of launches is the total number of launches (insured and uninsured); new satellite value is the value of a new satellite; share price is the real stock price for NYSE (Shiller, 2002) ; Number of Reinsurers is the number of U.S. professional reinsurers;Discount Rate is the 5 year U.S. Treasury bond rate. Reinsurers Surplus is surplus of U.S. professional reinsurers. All dollar amounts are expressed in real dollars. ∆X=X t -X t-1 .
